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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that fiscal convergence in the Euro area has been achieved at the expenses of real 
divergence in unemployment, investment and at, at least temporarily, growth. Statistical and 
econometric analysis support the view that the current fiscal framework has addressed debt 
sustainability concerns, but has imparted a pro-cyclical bias, which has contributed to economic 
divergence. The recent flexibility guidelines are a step in the right direction, but they are unlikely to 
have sizable effects. A reform of the fiscal framework and a mechanism for an intra-European 
unemployment insurance scheme is proposed. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This paper discusses the relationship between debt sustainability, the main goal of fiscal discipline, 
and economic convergence in the Euro area. Is there a trade-off between the two objectives? Does 
the current fiscal framework improve or compromise this trade-off? In the light of the recent 
changes in the Stability and Growth Pact, should the fiscal framework be amended in order to 
improve its effectiveness with respect to both objectives? What institutional reforms are needed in 
the European economic architecture?  
 
The first section introduces the notions of solvency and sustainability. I argue that the theoretically 
correct definition of solvency is of little practical utility because it is very difficult to implement, 
while the more operational concept of debt sustainability suffers from not being robust to small 
changes in forecasts for growth, the interest rates and fiscal variables. I propose that these standard 
definitions should be supplemented by probabilistic measures that answer the question: what is the 
probability of a sovereign default? 
 
Next I present evidence that during the crisis, budget positions in Euro Area member countries have 
converged, while their economies have diverged in several other dimensions: unemployment rates, 
investment, and, at least temporarily, growth.  I argue that this process, if not reversed, can 
undermine the support for, and therefore the existence of, the common currency. 
 
In order to understand the role of fiscal policy, I employ different approaches. First, I disentangle 
the role of country-specific shocks, possibly relating to product and labour market rigidities, from 
the role of policy-induced and common shocks, related to fiscal and monetary policies. While the 
former have contributed to raising the cross-country differences in debt ratios, I conclude that 
common shocks related to fiscal and monetary policies seem to have played an important offsetting 
role. This finding is consistent with the explanation that fiscal convergence in deficit/GDP ratios 
may have contributed to the divergence along the above mentioned economic dimensions. 
 
Second, I describe the way in which fiscal policies have reacted to debt sustainability and to 
cyclical considerations during the crisis. To this end, I estimate a simple “fiscal reaction function”. 
Consistently with the previous findings, I conclude that fiscal policy has strongly targeted debt 
sustainability, but was largely pro-cyclical during the crisis, possibly exacerbating business cycle 
swings. 
 
The paper also discusses the recent guidelines for flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact. I 
argue that the guidelines address exactly the correct issues, those described in the paper: pro-
cyclical policies, investment and incentives for reforms.  The structural reform clause, that 
exchanges fiscal flexibility for reforms, is the most effective part. The investment clause is likely to 
be ineffective, because it only concerns a very limited number of projects. The cyclical clause is 
excessively complex and does not remove the pro-cyclical bias documented in the paper.  
 
The final section contains some proposals of reforms of the Euro area economic governance. A 
country’s negative output gap should not simply imply slower domestic fiscal adjustment: it should 
be dealt at the level of the Euro area. I discuss the proposal of setting up a Euro-budget for counter-
cyclical policies, for example a European Unemployment Insurance scheme, were national 
unemployment schemes should be pooled. I also discuss a reform of the actual Stability and Growth 
Pact along three directions: simplification and focus on debt targets, more incentives for structural 
reforms, more individual freedom in allocating over time the agreed consolidation effort, a credible 
no-bail out clause. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Since 2008 countries in the Euro Area have experienced an unprecedented recession that has shaken 
the foundations of the common currency and jeopardized the European cohesion.  
 
A sharp fall in output, originally stemming from the US subprime and banking crisis, led to a freeze 
in the European inter-bank lending, an impeding disintegration of capital markets, wide-spread  
insolvencies of European sovereigns and banks. Capitals flew away from European countries 
perceived to be at risk of default, such as those in the “periphery”, and into countries considered to 
be “safe”. Banks in the periphery were effectively cut-off from the international bank lending, as 
banks in other countries perceived them to be risky, given their exposure to domestic sovereigns. As 
a result, sovereign bond spreads exploded, the inter-bank market froze, and financial markets started 
to price into interest rates of the periphery a premium to compensate for the risk of their exit from 
the Euro. Moreover, the credit crunch on banks and the sharp rise in government borrowing cost 
aggravated the recession. In the Euro area as a whole,  governments revenues fell, due to the 
contraction in output, and government expenditures rose (sometimes for bailing out banks, e.g. in 
Ireland, Spain and Belgium), worsening budget deficits and raising public debt.  
 
The European Union’s response was a program of international lending and bail-out/in, a  front-
loaded fiscal consolidation, the active intervention by the ECB supporting banks’ liquidity needs 
and governments, and the creation of new institutions dealing with financial surveillance, 
emergency lending and banking union.  
 
This multi-pronged approach has so far been successful in preventing the break-up of the Euro area. 
Moreover, fiscal discipline was restored and public debt was brought back under control. However, 
the side-effect was that the European economy plunged into a recession of unprecedented depth and 
persistence, and European economies started to diverge along many dimensions: unemployment, 
investment, and at least temporarily, growth. Should this trend persist, it may undermine the 
existence of the common currency and be a corrosive factor for the entire European project. This 
challenge is particularly serious for the Euro area, given that there exists no effective mechanism for 
inter-European redistribution and risk-sharing. 
 
This paper discusses the relationship between debt sustainability, the main goal of fiscal discipline, 
and economic convergence in the Euro area. Is there a trade-off between the two objectives? Does 
the current fiscal framework improve or compromise this trade-off? In the light of the recent 
changes in the Stability and Growth Pact, should the fiscal framework be amended in order to 
improve its effectiveness with respect to both objectives? The plan of the paper is the following. 
 
Section 2 discusses some preliminary methodological issues, and clarifies the often employed terms 
of “solvency” and “debt sustainability”. I propose that these standard definitions should be 
supplemented by probabilistic measures. 
 
In Section 3 I present evidence on the fact that during the crisis, the  budget positions of Euro 
member countries have converged, while their economies have diverged under several dimensions: 
unemployment rates, investment, and, at least temporarily, growth.  
 
In Section 4 I employ a variance decomposition approach in order to disentangle the role of 
country-specific shocks, possibly relating product and labour market rigidities, from the role of 
policy-induced and common shocks, related to fiscal and monetary policies. Furthermore, I describe 
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the way in which fiscal policies have reacted to debt sustainability and to cyclical considerations 
during the crisis. To this end, I estimate a simple “fiscal reaction function”.  
 
Section 5 discusses the recent guidelines for flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact. I argue that 
the guidelines address the correct issues, but they are unlikely to have noticeable effects. 
 
The final section contains some proposal of reforms of the Euro area economic governance: a 
European Unemployment Insurance scheme, and a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
 
2. SOLVENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Unlike monetary policy, whose main policy target, price stability, is uncontroversial, fiscal 
sustainability is a more elusive target. The Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact and 
its revisions focus of debt and deficit as a ratio of GDP. The idea is that when public debt grows 
“too much” it eventually becomes “unsustainable”. Debt and deficits, unlike price stability, should 
be understood as “intermediate”, rather than “final”, targets: variables that are more directly under 
the control of policymakers and that are closely related to the ultimate target: solvency. But what do 
we mean by sustainability and solvency? Are these different concepts? How can we measure them? 
This section clarifies these concepts, and argues that “solvency” is the theoretically correct concept, 
but it is difficult to implement; the concept of “sustainability” is more operational, although the 
conclusions one can derive are very sensitive to the small changes in the assumed path of fiscal 
variables, interest and growth rates. I end this section with some proposal for useful measures of 
solvency.  
 
Formally, a government is solvent if the present value of current and future expected primary 
surpluses (the excess of tax revenues over expenditures net of interests) is sufficient to repay the 
outstanding debt (see Romer, 2011). If it is not, some form of repudiation, be it in the form of 
inflation, restructuring, or outright default, is required. In a currency area such as the Eurozone, a 
member’s disorderly default has potentially very large spillovers on other members: it can 
undermine price stability, generate contagion and bank-runs, lead to the zone break up or require 
politically unpalatable fiscal transfers between members. But how do we know if a government is 
solvent? 
 
The problem with implementing this definition of solvency is that future revenues and expenditures 
are not known, so that, for a given level of debt, an abrupt change in expectations can lead to a self-
fulfilling default. Afraid of losing money, investors may refuse to roll-over the government debt and 
may ask for principal repayment; the government would then lose access to the capital market, and 
be unable to meet its obligations, validating the fears of default. Clearly, this scenario is more likely 
the larger the debt relative to the country resources (GDP) and the larger the interest rate the 
government has to pay (which implies a lower present value of future surpluses). The point, 
however, unless on an explosive trajectory, a given  level of debt relative to GDP can be consistent 
with a solvent or insolvent issuer. To some extent, solvency lies in the eyes of the beholder (or in 
economists’ jargon, there may exist “multiple self-fulfilling equilibria”). 
 
A necessary condition for solvency is that the debtor should not use the proceeds of new borrowing 
to pay the interests on existing debt, e.g. he should not run a “Ponzi scheme”. This condition 
requires that the growth rate of debt to GDP ratio does not exceed the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the growth rate of nominal GDP growth.  Implementing this solvency 
requirement is quite difficult, however. In fact, the countries that face low real interest rates, 
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because they are perceived to be less risky, are paradoxically more likely to violate the solvency 
condition (see an example in the Appendix)  
 
This problems have led to the more operational concept of “sustainability”. This concept is 
routinely employed for example by the IMF (the so called Debt Sustainability Analysis, DSA) and 
other international organizations. From the budget constraint identity it is possible to construct debt 
scenarios based on assumption on primary balances, interest rates and GDP growth. Recent 
applications take into account the currency and maturity composition of the debt, the type of owner 
(domestic vs foreign, private vs public), the exchange rate regime, cyclical and political conditions  
Also, it is possible to construct different simulations where the consequences of different shocks (to 
output, inflation, interest rates etc) are evaluated, taking into account the fact these shocks are 
correlated with each other and with fiscal variables (see Celasun, Debrun, Ostry, 2006).  
 
While DSA scenarios are quite useful for assessing a country’s vulnerability to different shocks, 
they are very sensitive to the underlying assumptions on growth and interest rates. In the appendix, I 
show an example where, under plausible assumptions on the long-run primary balance (1.5% of 
GDP) and the real interest rate (2.5%), the maximum level of debt a country could technically 
sustain can vary between 75% and 300% (!) of GDP, for relatively minor changes in forecast 
growth rate (from 0.5 to 2%).1 
 
The way to avoid the pitfall of these indicators is to explicitly acknowledge the probabilistic nature 
of solvency. Rather than asking “is public debt sustainable?”, the correct question is “what is the 
probability of a default?” There are basically two ways to answer this question. The first looks at 
asset prices and balance sheets in order to extract the probability of default that is implicit in them. 
The second considers the past experiences of default and tries to identify the vulnerabilities in 
fundamentals that are more likely to result in insolvencies or bail-outs.  
 
An example of the former is the analysis of Credit Default Swaps for sovereign bonds. These are  
insurance contracts, traded daily, where the protection seller, typically a bank, commits to buy a 
bond from the protection seeker, at the nominal value, in case of a default. The price of insurance, 
expressed in terms of the value of the bond, can be used to recover the probability that two parties 
place on the default event (see Hull and White, 2000, and Manasse and Trigilia, 2010 for an 
application to Ireland and Italy). These default probabilities give the “pulse” of market perceptions. 
However, these are very volatile and are not suitable to assess a country’s “fundamentals” resilience 
to solvency crises. Alternatively, sovereign default probabilities can be recovered by applying 
contingent claim analysis to the balance sheet of the government (see Gray, Merton and Bodie, 
2007): what is crucial here is the quality of the data. Finally, “computer intensive” algorithms can 
be applied to past episodes of sovereign default in order to recover the combinations of 
characteristics that, with high probability, are conducive to sovereign default (for example, high 
level of external debt as a ratio of GDP, run-away inflation, short maturity of debt, fixed exchange 
rates, the proximity of elections, a sharp recession, see Manasse and Roubini, 2006). These 
probabilistic measures should complement the standard solvency/sustainability considerations. 
 
 
3. THE SUSTAINABILITY-CONVERGENCE TRADE-OFF  
 
One of the most striking aspects of the ongoing economic crisis in the Euro Area is that fiscal 
convergence among member countries has been associated to economic divergence along many 
dimensions. By fiscal convergence I mean that over time budgetary positions  have become more 
                                                 
1
 The example disccussed in the Appendix makes the standard, although rather implaudsible assumption that the long 
term real interest rate , the rate of growth and the primary balance are independent from each other  
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similar between Euro area members. By real divergence I mean a tendency of European economies 
to become more different in terms of unemployment rates, investment, and, at least temporarily, 
growth rates.  
 
We know since the work of Robert Mundell (1961) that “asymmetries” between countries that share 
a common currency is problematic, in particular when international labor mobility is low, so that 
large differences in unemployment persist; when wage and price flexibility is limited, so that real 
shocks fall on employment and output levels rather than prices and wages; and when the area is not 
equipped with an insurance mechanisms that help countries in recession. Real divergence if not 
tackled, can undermine the political support for the common currency. This is already happening in 
Italy, France and, concerning EU membership, in the UK.  
 
Let’s start from fiscal convergence. Figure 1 shows the average, mean, maximum and minimum 
government structural balances expressed as a ratio of potential output. On average, fiscal 
stabilizers were allowed to operate between 2007 and 2009 when the average balance deteriorated 
from -2.8 to -5.4 percent of potential output (blue line). In this period the dispersion among Euro 
area members widened sharply. However, since 2009 a huge consolidation effort brought back the 
average structural balance to -1.3% in 2014. Interestingly, the difference between the best (green 
line, Finland, Luxembourg) and worse (yellow line, Greece) fiscal performers shrank. The cross 
country dispersion of budget positions, the standard deviation of the structural balance/potential 
output ratio of the different countries at a point in time, the red line, took a plunge. A period of 
divergence in budgetary positions in the years before 2009 was followed by convergence there 
since: countries with larger deficits consolidated  more.  
 
 
 
Figure 2a plots the average (un-weighted) debt/GDP ratio of Euro Area members, shown by the 
light-blue line (left scale). Since the start of the crisis in 2008, average debt rose from 52% to 85% 
of GDP in 2014. In most countries this was the result of the e fall in output and the working of 
automatic stabilizers. In a few countries, such as Ireland, and to a lesser extent, Spain, this was due 
to the budgetary impact of bank rescue costs. The wedge between the largest and the smallest debt 
ratios (Greece, green dotted line and Estonia/Luxembourg, yellow dotted line, respectively) 
widened. The red line in Figure 2 shows the standard deviation normalized by the mean (the 
Coefficient of Variation, CV, right scale). This measures of dispersion increases in the period 
leading to the crisis, from 2004 to 2007, but since then it drops considerably, by one third, from the 
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peak in 20072. Unfortunately, the interpretation of this indicator is not unambiguous in this case, 
since its recent fall in reflects at least in part the rise in the mean value of Euro area debt. 
 
 
 
To shed more light on this issue, I concentrate on the evolution of the debt/GDP ratio since 2008 in 
Figure 2b. Each country is represented by a point. The x-axis reports the initial value of the debt 
ratio in 2008, while the y-axis shows the change in the ratio between 2008-2014. For convergence, 
we would require that high initial debts should be associated with low debt increases in the 
following period, a negative relationship. However, no clear such pattern emerges here  
 
 
 
On the contrary, the European economies show clear elements of economic divergence. I will limit 
my discussion to unemployment, investment and growth. 
 
                                                 
2
 For debt /GDP ratio , investment and unemployment, I use the CV as a measure od dispersion because, normalizing 
for the average, this a pure number independent of the scale of measurement. However, for structural balances and 
growth rates, which occasionally take average values close to zero, I employ the standard deviation. 
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Figure 3 depicts the dynamics of the rate of unemployment in the Euro area. On average, the rate of 
unemployment (blue) almost doubled since the crisis, rising from 6.2% in 2007 to 11.8 in 2013 and 
moving slightly down since. The difference between the highest rate (Slovak Republic and then 
Greece, in green) and the lowest rate (Luxembourg in yellow), rose dramatically during the crisis, 
and correspondingly the coefficient of variation (in red, right scale) rose dramatically, reversing a 
period of convergence from 2000 to 2007. 
 
 
 
In Figure 4, I show the ratio of total (private and public) investment in GDP. The average ratio, blue 
line, shows a huge drop in 2007, when it fell from 27% to 20% of GDP in 2009. Investment 
collapsed in all countries, but fell proportionately more were the share was larger. In fact the 
distance between the highest (Latvia) and the lowest (Germany) investment shares initially 
collapsed, due to the crash in the high share countries. Accordingly, our measure of cross-country 
dispersion (red line) more than halved between 2007 and 2010. From 2010 onward, however, the 
investment shares started to diverge again, almost reaching the peaks of the pre-crisis period. This 
time however, the divergence was mainly do to the drop in low-share countries (Cyprus). 
 
 
 
The dynamics of GDP growth is more ambigous, see Figure 5a. There is a double dip  in average 
growth, first in 2008 and then in 2011 (blueline). Since then countries in the Euro area seem to have 
settle to a low growth equilibrium. The  first recession goes together with a large rise in divergence, 
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with the standard deviation spiking from 2.6  to 4.2 (right scale). The second recession in 2012 is 
preceeded by another rise in dispersion. Unlike the case of unemployment and investment, the rise 
in the dispersion of growth rates seems more temporary in nature, as both high and low growth 
countries are now converging to similar growth paths.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to dig on the issue of goriwth convergence/divergence,  during the crisis years 2008-2014, 
Figure 5b takes a different perspective. On the horizontal axis I plot the growth rate of GDP in 
2008, and on the vertical axis I show the cumulated growth in the period 2008-2014. Each point 
represents a country. The fact the points lie on a positive sloped line implies that countries where 
growth was initially higher (lower), grew faster (slower) during the crisis. This picture implies 
divergence of growth rates since the crisis. 
 
 
 
Many factors may have contributed to the examples of economic divergence illustrated before.  
They include supply and demand characteristics as well as features of the capital market.  
 
Consider the consequences of an aggregate demand shock, for example a credit crunch stemming 
from a freeze of the interbank market, or a budget cut. The effects of a given demand shock depend 
on supply side features such as the degree of price and wage rigidity. If product markets are not 
competitive, firms can exploit their market power and keep price unaltered, so that the consequent 
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fall in consumption will be larger; similarly, if wages do not adjust in the face of lower demand, 
firms will need larger cuts in employment. In Manasse and Rota Baldini, 2013, we present evidence 
that shows that  
 
- the countries which experienced the larger rise in unemployment between 2008-12 
are those where unemployment was higher in 2000-2008, implying that initial labour market 
distortions partly explain the subsequent rise in unemployment; 
- the countries where per capita GDP declined more or grew less during the in the crisis are 
those where total factor productivity had risen less before the crisis, implying that those 
characteristics which inhibited productivity growth before the crisis largely account for the bad 
performances during the crisis. 
 
Moreover, the degree of competition in the banking industry and the perceived riskiness of banks in 
high debt countries, together with the widening of interest spreads during the crisis, might have 
contributed to the severity of the credit crunch in peripheral countries, fostering the disparities in 
investment behaviour documented above. 
 
Given the scope of this paper, I will focus on the role of fiscal policy.  While budget cuts lead to  
lower demand at least in the short term,  the size of the “fiscal multiplier” is controversial (see 
Blanchard, Leigh, 2013) . Figure 6 shows the relationship between the dispersion debt/GDP ratios 
and the dispersion in unemployment rates (a similar relationship holds replacing the unemployment 
rate with GDP growth rate). On the vertical axis I plot the coefficient of variation (CV) of 
unemployment rates across Euro area countries in a given year, on the horizontal axis I show the 
CV of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the same year. Years of convergence in debt ratios (points towards 
the origin on the x-axis) are on average associated to periods of divergence of unemployment rates 
(up on the y-axis), and vice versa. The figure shows that since 2000 there has been  a trade-off 
between debt convergence and “real” convergence in the Euro area. 
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4. INTERPRETING THE TRADE-OFF 
 
In order to understand to which extent fiscal convergence can explain real economic divergence in 
several dimensions in the Euro area, particularly during the crisis’ years, I proceed in two steps. 
First, I decompose the differences in debt ratios into country-specific shocks and common/policy 
shock. The former capture for example supply side and credit markets characteristic, while the latter 
measure the importance of fiscal and monetary policies.  Second, I estimate a “fiscal reaction 
function” in order to understand whether fiscal policy was pro or anti-cyclical in the Euro area, and 
the extent to which it targeted debt sustainability.  
 
A Variance Decomposition Calculation 
The measure of dispersion (variance) between the countries’ debt ratios at each point in time can be 
approximated by the sum of three components (see Appendix 1). The first is the percentage 
contribution of the dispersion of nominal debts. This is represented by the red line in Figure 7. It 
rises when nominal debts become more different from the mean; the second is the percentage 
contribution of the dispersion between nominal GDPs (see the violet line in the figure): when this 
component rises, nominal incomes diverge in the euro area. These two terms account for country-
specific characteristics, and account for “asymmetric” responses possibly due to supply side and 
credit markets conditions. A bail-out of the banking sector, for example, would show up as a 
country-specific shock  to nominal debt that would raise the debt dispersion among Euro area 
countries. The third term represents the percentage contribution of the co-movements between the 
two (yellow line). This “covariance” term is particularly interesting: when this term is positive, 
domestic debts tend to move together with domestic incomes. Thus this term captures either policy-
induced changes or common shocks. One example of a policy induced change is a pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy.  For example, if fiscal policy tightens and debt falls relatively more in countries where 
income falls, this would generate a positive covariance. The direction of causality could also be the 
opposite: for example, if a more restrictive budgetary policy leads to a stronger recession, this could 
also be reflected in a positive covariance term. Alternatively, a positive covariance could result 
from a common shock, for example a fall in inflation due to a restrictive monetary policy, which 
would reduce nominal debts along with nominal incomes in the different countries. Clearly, a 
positive co-movement between debt and income reduces the cross-country dispersion in debt ratios. 
The percentage contribution of this term to the dispersion in debt/GDP ratio is measured by the 
yellow line (with a minus sign) 
 
Country-specific shocks in nominal GDP and debt contributed to raise the cross-country differences 
in debt ratios, from 2007 to 2013 (see Figure 7). Their individual shares of the total variance rose 
from 10 to 20 percent. What happened in this period, however, is that these two effects were almost 
exactly compensated by the “covariance” term, representing common and policy shocks, which also 
doubled, accounting for about 40% of total variance and contributing to reduce the disparities in 
debt/GDP ratios.  
 
This exercise suggests that both asymmetric (such as bail-out) / supply factors and symmetric 
/demand factors were at work, with similar importance, during the crisis, pushing disparities in 
European debt ratios in opposite directions, which explains  why the dispersion in debt ratios does 
not move unambiguously.  
 
 13 
 
 
 
 
A Fiscal Reaction Function Approach 
This section digs more into the role of fiscal policy, and in particular examines whether the fiscal 
consolidation effort that was undertaken in the Euro area since 2009 may account, at least partially, 
for the divergence of unemployment rates, investment and possibly growth, and the convergence of 
debt ratios and structural balances.  
One way to describe the fiscal policy rule at the level of the Eurozone is to estimate a ‘fiscal 
reaction function’ (see Gavin, M and R Perotti, 1997, and  Manasse, 2014). The idea is that a policy 
maker follows a particular discretionary policy by adjusting the primary balance to the ratio of  debt 
to GDP and to the cyclical state of the economy in the previous period (see Appendix for the 
details). Debt sustainability considerations would require a larger increase in the surplus the larger 
the debt/GDP ratio. A cyclical stabilisation concern would require a lower increase in the surplus 
the lower is the economy’s growth rate. The main results, obtained for the 18 Euro area countries in 
the period 2008-14 suggest that, on average, fiscal policy was tighter in more indebted countries, as 
expected,  but also in countries where growth was lower, not higher. In particular I find that 
-  a one percent  fall in the growth rate is on average associated with a cyclically adjusted 
primary balance tightening of almost one fourth of a percentage point of GDP. This estimate 
indicates that since 2008 the Eurozone fiscal framework has delivered a  procyclical outcome, 
possibly exacerbating movements output. 
- A ten percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio is associated to about a one percent 
rise in the primary surplus relative to potential output. This implies that fiscal policy has indeed 
targeted debt sustainability, being more restrictive where debt was higher.  
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5. THE NEW “FLEXIBILITY” GUIDELINES  
The evidence suggests that during the crisis the Euro area fiscal framework has focused  mainly on 
fiscal sustainability, at the cost of implementing pro-cyclical policies. This interpretation is 
consistent with the observation budgetary positions have converged among Euro area countries, 
while divergences in unemployment rates, investment, and, partially growth, worsened.  
In January the European Commission has issued guidelines on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
that aim precisely at contrasting pro-cyclical policies, favour investment and promote growth. The 
guidelines allow members to dilute the fiscal consolidation when cyclical conditions are particularly 
negative, when a country implements growth-friendly structural reforms, and provide more “fiscal 
space” for investment, particularly during recessions (see for a detailed discussion Manasse, 2015). 
The question addressed in this section is whether these changes will be enough to alleviate the pro-
cyclical bias of the current framework. The answer is that they are a step in the right direction, 
although their impact will be limited. 
Consider the “structural reform” clause. This is the most convincing part. Structural reforms are 
costly to implement and there is evidence that in the short run may have a negative impact on the 
economy (see Aksoy, 2014). The “discount” in terms of lower fiscal consolidation can be 
substantial, up to half a point of GDP. A number of provisions make sure that the medium term 
objective (MTO) will not be waved, and that the 3 percent deficit /GDP limit will not be violated.  
Although the large discount applies only to Member States that are not subject to an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP), interestingly also these countries may be allowed “more time” for 
adjusting, even if the opportunity is conditional to having respected previous commitments under 
the EDP. 
The “investment” clause says that the contributions to the new-born European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI) will not count in the debt and deficit criteria, and that some extra space for 
investment can be granted, in terms of deviations from the MTO, for countries in recession 
(negative growth, or output below potential by at least 1.5% ), for projects co-financed by the EU, 
and for countries not in EDP. Notice that the deductible contributions to the EFSI are quite limited, 
about 21billions. Moreover, many countries with open EDP (Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Poland, France, Ireland, Greece, Spain) are also undergoing large recessions and will  be eligible 
only for the exemptions of the capital contributions to the Fund, but not for the other co-financed 
investments . Moreover, the clause does not apply to non EU project: for example private-public-
partnerships (PPPs) are not eligible: the overall impact is likely to be minor. 
Finally, the “cyclical clause” is quite problematic. In theory, it should eliminate the pro-cyclical 
bias that was documented above. In practice, it does not. The first problem is complexity: rather 
than simply identifying a recession with some standard definition, say at least two consecutive  
quarters of  negative GDP growth, here a distinction is arbitrarily made between “exceptionally 
bad”,  “”very bad”, “bad”, “normal” and “good” times, and there are no less than three indicators 
defining where one stands (real GDP growth, the output gap,  the rate of  growth of potential 
output). Moreover, the cyclical correction is higher or lower depending on whether the debt/GDP 
ratio is above or below 60%. In Figure 8 I plot the size of the required adjustment (vertical axis) as 
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a function of the output gap (horizontal axis) and of the difference between actual and potential 
growth (the width axis), for the case of debt/GDP ratio exceeding 60% (the rules are softer when 
debt is below 60% of GDP). 
                      Figure 8. The cyclical conditions and the fiscal adjustment 
 
In “exceptionally bad” times, (output gap below -4% or negative GDP growth), the adjustment is 
zero. Yet fiscal consolidation rises to no less than 0.25 (for countries with debt-to-GDP ratio above 
60% or with sustainability risk) as we move into “very bad” times (between -4 and 3%), that is, 
when economy is still   well below capacity. The adjustment steps up even more during “bad times” 
(a gap is between -3 and -1.5%), at the first sign of recovery (when actual growth exceeds potential 
growth). One implication of this complex rule is the presence of “steps” which have the unpleasant 
implication of requiring different fiscal efforts for countries in very similar cyclical conditions (just 
before/after the thresholds). More importantly, fiscal contractions are still required during bad 
times, so that the pro-cyclical bias is alive and kicking.   
A final difficulty, is that the guidelines share the plethora of SGP indicators (structural 
unemployment rates, non-accelerating wage rates, potential output, output gaps, cyclically adjusted 
balances) that are subject to erratic revisions with far-reaching and possibly misleading  
implications for policy (see Tereanu, E, A Tuladhar, and A Simonem, 2014).  As a case in point, 
Ireland in 2009 and 2011 saw a large flow of emigration to the UK as a result of the recession. 
Calculations of potential output showed a large decline, as a consequence of a lower labour force. 
As a result, the ratio of budget balance to potential output soared, indicating a large expansion, 
while the government was actually tightening fiscal policy. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND SOME PROPOSALS 
It is unlikely that the current fiscal framework will enable the Eurozone to improve the trade-off 
between debt sustainability and divergence of unemployment, investment and, possibly, growth . 
Real divergence could become a very serious threat to the existence of common currency and 
undermine its support. The question is how to get rid of the “water” of economic divergence  
without sacrifying the “baby” of fiscal sustainability. The problem of possibly persistent 
“asymmetric shocks” has to be confronted both ex-ante and ex-post.  
Ex-post, a country’s recession should not simply be entitled to a slower domestic fiscal adjustment: 
it should be dealt at the level of the Euro area by stronger Euro area fiscal capacity. A Euro-budget 
for counter-cyclical policies should be created. It could be funded by committing shares of 
members’ tax bases, say V.A.T. It could take the form of a European Unemployment Insurance 
scheme, and pool actual unemployment insurance schemes and resources. Eligibility criteria should 
be harmonised across participant countries, so that the duration of subsidies, their conditionality, the 
fraction of the last wage and so on, should be the same in all participant countries. Each country 
should maintain a balanced position in the fund, over a given period, say five years, so as to avoid a 
permeant subsidization of unemployment in the South by Northern Europeans. Participation in the 
fund could be voluntary, but conditional on meeting a number of requirements in terms of labor 
market flexibility and decentralization of wage bargaining. Politically, this step could show to 
Europeans that Europe exists and helps. 
Ex-ante, the actual SGP framework should be drastically simplified. It’s “control and punish” 
bureaucratic logic should be abandoned and incentives should play a major role. The “preventive 
arm” should focus on the sustainability of domestic and external debt only: these are the best 
indicators of country vulnerability to solvency and liquidity crises, and these variables have the 
largest impact on other euro members. These are “final” targets. Each country should negotiate a 
reasonable medium term adjustment path for the debt, a reduction of x% in the debt/GDP ratio to be 
achieved in, say, four years. This target should take into account the cost of structural reforms.  
Rather than setting complex rules based on non-transparent indicators for deciding the desired fiscal 
effort, the corrective arm should simply provide sanctions proportional to the deviation from the x% 
debt target, at the end of the period. If the country has managed to reduce the debt ratio by more 
than agreed, the extra points could be credited to the country so as to enable it to pursue more 
expansionary policies in the following period (a “point system” similar to that for driving license, 
see Manasse, 2007). Note that this system would not need any complicated “correction” for the 
cycle: each country would decide how to allocate the required consolidation effort over the four 
years, presumably choosing lower adjustment in bad times, to be made up in good times. 
Such an incentive system would clearly require an effective enforcement system. Once a European 
Stabilization Fund were in place, the system would require a clear no-bail out commitment for 
insolvent governments, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) should be gradually 
transformed into a sort of a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (see Krueger, 
2002). 
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APPENDIX 
 
An application of the No Ponzi Game solvency condition 
Table 1 below describes the average rate of growth of the debt ratio and the average cost of debt, 
net nominal growth, in the period from 2000-2012. Solvency requires that the debt ratio growth rate 
is below the interest rate differential. It turns out that only a few countries (in yellow), Belgium, 
Cyprus, Malta, and Italy, not prima-facie examples of fiscal discipline, satisfy the “no Ponzi 
scheme”. 
 
                       
                               Table 1: Solvent Countries (yellow) according to “No Ponzi Scheme”condition     
                                                              Country        Growth debt/GDP   Int. rate- Nom.Growth 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on World Bank data-  
A country is solvent if the growth rate of the debt/GDP ratio is less than the interest rate-nominal growth rate 
differential  
 
An example of the lack of robustness of DSA 
Consider the following example. DSA is often used in order to calculate the maximum sustainable 
“long run” level of a debt relative to  GDP, . This denotes a level above which debt may explode, 
and is given by the formula 
 
 
 
 where a denotes the ratio of the primary balance to GDP, n is the rate of growth of GDP, r is the 
average real interest rate on debt. Assume that the fiscal authority can maintain a primary surplus of 
1.5% of GDP in the long run, and that the real rate of interest is 2.5%. Then the calculation implies 
that a country can sustain a debt as high as three times of GDP, if the long-run growth is forecast at 
2 percent per year; the same country could sustain a debt of only  75% of GDP if  growth turns out 
to be  1/2 percent per year. Are such forecast errors implausibly high? Unfortunately, they are not. 
Figure 9 below shows the average forecast errors (left scale), made by the IMF during the period 
2011-2013, for advanced economies. Growth in “Stressed Euro area economies” (Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain) turned out to be almost one and a half points below the forecasts. 
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Figure 9: growth forecast error by the IMF 
(source: WEO October 2014) 
 
 
Variance decomposition 
At a point in time, the cross country variance of this ratio, Vart (B/Y) can be approximated by the 
sum of three terms in equation (1) (see Stuart and Ord, 1998). The first is the the cross-country 
dispersion of nominal debts, measured by the (squared) coefficient of variation at a point in time  
; the second is the cross-country dispersion of countries’ nominal GDPs,  measured againg by the 
squared coefficient of variation,  ; the third is  the covariance between the countries’ debts and 
outputs at a given time,  Cov(B,Y) 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal reaction function 
The estimated equation is the following : 
               (2)   
where   is the (change in) the cyclically adjusted primary balance expressed in terms of 
potential output, DEBT represents the net general government debt as share of GDP,  GROWTH is 
GDP rate of growth,  and  represent a fixed effect for country i, a set of time-dummies and 
the error term, respectively. The coefficient of the lagged primary balance is expected to be 
negative, as a larger surplus this year should require a lower tightening next year to ensure debt 
stability. For the same reason, the coefficient of lagged net debt is expected to be positive – lower 
debt this year should reduce the required tightening next year. Finally, tax-smoothing/automatic 
stabilisers considerations would imply a positive coefficient on the GDP growth rate, as policy 
should tighten in good times and loosen in bad times. The estimation results are presented in Table 
2  below. 
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Table 2 . Regression results 
DCAPB Coefficient Standard 
error 
t P>|t| [95% confidence interval] 
CAPB
-1 -0.552 0.100 -5.52 0.000 -0.752 -0.353
GROWTH
-1 -0.229 0.089 -2.59 0.012 -0.406 -0.053
DEBT
-1 0.011 0.010 1.18 0.242 -0.008 0.0302
 
The analysis considers the following EZ countries: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Malta, and the Slovak Republic, for the years 2008–2014. The data sources are the IMF and 
the OECD. 
 21 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
CV, Coefficient of Variation 
DSA, Debt Sustainability Analysis 
ESM; European Stability Mechanism 
EU, European Union 
EDP, Excessive Deficit Procedure 
EIB, European Investment Banks 
GDP, Gross Domestic Product 
IMF, International Monetary Fund 
MTO, Medium Term Objective 
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PPP, Private Public Partnership 
SGP, Stability and Growth Pact  
WEO, World Economic Outlook 
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